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Abstract
Direct democracy is often proposed as a possible solution to the 21st-century prob-
lems of democracy. However, this suggestion clashes with the size and complexity
of 21st-century societies, entailing an excessive cognitive burden on voters, who
would have to submit informed opinions on an excessive number of issues. In
this paper I argue for the development of “voting avatars”, autonomous agents de-
bating and voting on behalf of each citizen. Theoretical research from artificial
intelligence, and in particular multiagent systems and computational social choice,
proposes 21st-century techniques for this purpose, from the compact representa-
tion of a voter’s preferences and values, to the development of voting procedures
for autonomous agents use only.
1 Introduction
Computational studies of voting are mostly motivated by two intended applications:
the coordination of societies of artificial agents, and the study of human collective de-
cisions whose complexity requires the use of computational techniques. Both research
directions are too often confined to theoretical studies, with unrealistic assumptions
constraining their significance for real-world situations. Most practical applications of
these results are therefore confined to low-stakes decisions, which are of great impor-
tance in expanding the use of algorithms in society, but are far from high-stakes choices
such as political elections, referenda, or parliamentary decisions, which societies still
make using old-fashioned technologies like paper ballots.
In this paper I argue in favour of conceiving “voting avatars”, artificial agents that
are able to act as proxies for voters in collective decisions at any level of society. Be-
sides being an ideal test-bed for a large number of techniques developed in the field of
multiagent systems and artificial intelligence in general, agent-mediated social choice
may also suggest innovative solutions to low voter participation, a problem that is en-
demic in most practical implementations of electronic decision processes.
From low-stakes/high-frequency to high-stakes/high-frequency social choice. In
their quest for practical applications, researchers in (computational) social choice
1
have argued in favour of moving away from political elections, and high-stakes/low-
frequency collective decisions in general, where computational techniques and stud-
ies are less relevant. Low-stakes decisions such as answering to a personalised search
query, or designing group recommender systems for retailers, were instead identified as
more suitable applications for their research (Boutilier and Lu, 2011). A similar trend
can be observed in existing platforms for electronic democracy such as LiquidFeed-
back1, which were initially designed to be used for policy design by political parties,
and evolved into decision systems for smaller committees and low-stakes decisions
(Behrens et al., 2014). Many researchers, however, (including the author of this paper)
became interested in social choice with the dream of having an impact on how large so-
cieties take high-stakes decisions. Technological advancements now make it possible
to carry out polls and surveys among citizens in almost real-time. Has the time come
for high-stakes/high-frequency collective decision-making?
Electronic, direct, participative, and interactive democracy. Electronic democ-
racy (or e-democracy) is an umbrella term that groups several pieces of software and
policies that aim at increasing citizens’ participation in collective decisions by means
of digital technologies. Among those, the most relevant applications for social choice
theorists revolve around the development of interactive or direct forms of democracy
through the design of electronic platforms. While on the one hand existing platforms
tend to be rather simple, or, as mentioned in the previous paragraphs, they are restricted
to low-stakes decisions, on the other hand more encompassing visions of direct democ-
racy often seem excessively utopian in imagining an active participation of the entire
electorate to collective debates and votes (Green-Armytage, 2015). Real-world exper-
iments seem to suggest the opposite: when the citizens of Madrid were asked to vote
directly (and electronically) on the renovation projects of one of the most important
squares in the city, only 8% of eligible voters actually took part in the voting process.2
The use of direct (or interactive) democracy platforms for high-stakes decisions seems
to produce a very low citizen participation, a phenomenon that might be considered
as an instance of the well-known paradox of voting (Downs, 1957), i.e., the cost of
casting a single vote exceeding the expected benefit of affecting the result of the elec-
tion. Can we imagine a technological advancement that will solve the problem of low
participation in direct democratic decisions?
Artificial intelligence and democracy. Techniques from artificial intelligence (AI),
such as the use of machine learning for user profiling and micro-targeting, have been
widely used in recent political campaigns, and their effects have been widely debated
by the press. However, most articles limit the future use of AI in elections to the design
of centralised algorithms that take collective decisions from the collection of citizens’
preferences and behaviours.3 While discussing the potential misuse of data analysis
techniques by central governments, a recent article by Helbing et al. (February 2017)
claims that “If data filters and recommendation and search algorithms would be se-
1http://liquidfeedback.org/
2https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/02/28/inenglish/1488280371_057827.html
3A vision already proposed by Asimov (1955) in the short story “Franchise”.
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lectable and configurable by the user, we could look at problems from multiple per-
spectives, and we would be less prone to manipulation by distorted information”. Can
we develop personalised AI techniques that help people construct and motivate their
views and voting behaviour in collective decisions?
Agent-mediated e-commerce and computational mechanism design. Negotiation
technology, trust-building, and a vast number of other techniques developed in multi-
agent systems found application in e-commerce, where human and artificial agents
participate with various roles in suitably designed markets. A research field that started
more than fifteen years ago (Sierra, 2004; Feigenbaum et al., 2009; Dash et al., 2003)
helped creating a new reality: “The anticipated agent-mediated economy is almost
upon us” (Parkes, 2017). Once people get used to delegate their consumer power to
artificial agents, will they be ready to delegate their citizen power as well?
Computational social choice and its applications. The field of computational so-
cial choice (COMSOC) started around ten years ago when a group of researchers with
common interests in computer science, economics, and political science regrouped in
an international workshop,4 and flourished up to the recent publication of a handbook
(Brandt et al., 2016). Research in this field is rather theoretical, and its motivation often
ambiguous between developing technologies for the coordination of artificial agents
and the study of theoretical properties of voting mechanisms to be later used by hu-
mans. Unrealistic assumptions of complete knowledge or full rationality of individual
agents limit the applicability of many of its results, a problem that would be less rel-
evant in agent-mediated institutions. If the field is to succeed and prosper, it needs
applications to feed its research agenda, experimenting with either real-world situa-
tions (as argued by Bouveret, 2017) or agent-based technologies. A recent positive
example is the creation of the Spliddit webpage (Shah, 2017), which created a fruit-
ful loop between practical applications and theoretical research. Can we conceive of
technologies enabling agent-mediated social choices, where theorems and algorithms
from COMSOC research could be applied without changing their currently unrealistic
assumptions?
2 Voting Avatars - A Short Story
Sylvia (a human being) lives in a world where each citizen with the right to vote is
paired with a voting avatar, an autonomous agent that is able to communicate with her
and who is authenticated by a central voting authority to vote on her behalf.5 Sylvia is
the only authorised person to communicate with her voting avatar (e.g., speech recog-
nition, fingerprint authentication, ...). The central voting authority is a democratically
elected government with executive power, supported by an elected bureaucracy who
sets the agenda of debates, polls, and votes to be conducted among the entire elec-
torate. Each morning Sylvia receives the daily political agenda, with issues classified
4www.illc.uva.nl/COMSOC/workshops.html
5This section may read like a science-fiction novel, but so do many academic papers advocating for direct
democracy.
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by themes and by interest: local, regional, national, and global (the world in which
Sylvia lives is likely to be a world federation). Sylvia can simply ignore the message
and have a good cup of coffee, as she does on most days: Her voting avatar has al-
ready been searching the internet for opinions, consulted influential avatars, and built
a preliminary voting behaviour for her daily agenda. During the day, the voting avatar
will follow all discussions and correlated votes, and update Sylvia’s voting behaviour
based on this information and on the level of strategic behaviour she set (currently she
left the “strategic voting” button unchecked, like most of her friends claim to do). Her
voting avatar has been training for years on a number of votes Sylvia takes directly
every month, as well as by observing her conversations on social media, by reading
her emails, and by having direct conversations with her every time that the avatar made
a wrong or debatable decision on her behalf. Last night, for instance, Sylvia realised
that the avatar suggested voting against issuing extra visas to refugees from the Mars
colonies, based on a number of dubious sources that she had consulted a couple of days
earlier out of curiosity. They discussed the issue for a good 5 minutes, clarifying her
position on immigration, the job market, and charity (she actually found the discus-
sion very helpful in constructing a solid view on these issues). Today Sylvia is quite
interested in the debate on global freezing, and her voting avatar is proposing a vote in
support of the current bill (decisions with long-term consequences involve a long series
of iterated votes on improving proposals, in order to maximise consensus). Sylvia has
access to a short summary of the reasons supporting the avatar’s suggestions, with links
to a number of articles by authors she finds reliable, extracts from email discussions she
had with a friend on this topic, as well as a list of her past decisions on related issues.
She notices that the coherence warning is yellow, suggesting that her vote clashes with
some of the positions she defended on the energy market a couple of months ago, but
not being a public figure she chooses to ignore the warning...
3 Multiagent Systems and Artificial Intelligence
In the past 20 years researchers in the field of multiagent systems, a research commu-
nity in artificial intelligence, have been importing and adapting models from theoretical
economics and political science to conceive and program societies of artificial agents
(see, e.g., Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009). Social choice mechanisms have been
proposed for collective decision-making in multiagent systems, stimulating research,
e.g., on the computational properties of voting rules, the development of tractable pro-
cedures for strategic voting, or the development of approximation algorithms for com-
puting the result of particularly hard rules.
Together with algorithmic game theory, computational social choice is currently
one of the most well-represented research areas in conferences on multiagent systems.6
Many of the techniques introduced by COMSOC researchers would find a prime ap-
plication in the development of voting avatars for agent-mediated collective decisions,
such as those described in the short story above.
6See, e.g., the proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sys-
tems, AAMAS (www.ifaamas.org).
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Strategic voting. Modelling human voters as perfectly rational agents is a useful
simplification for obtaining intuitive theorems, but these assumptions limit significantly
the applicability of these results (take the Gibbard-Sattertwaithe Theorem as a classical
example). Modelling bounded rationality is a big challenge in both AI and Economics,
a problem that is absent, or less severe, in societies of artificial agents. Moreover,
many of the techniques developed by COMSOC researchers for the analysis of strategic
voting (see, e.g., Conitzer and Walsh, 2016; Faliszewski and Rothe, 2016) may find
application test-beds in agent-mediated collective choices.
Machine learning. A voting avatar needs to be able to learn a voter’s views and
preferences from a set of voters’ choices, that can moreover be evolving over time,
and be more or less consistent with a set of existing views already present in society.
This certainly is a challenging problem to frame, and one for which large personalised
datasets are hard to construct. The use of machine learning techniques is still widely
unexplored in social choice, and existing papers are mostly focused on creating novel
voting methods (see, e.g., Xia, 2013). A fruitful starting point may be the conception
of decision-support systems based on past voting behaviour.
Iterative voting. Voting methods that have been discarded as too complex or too
unintuitive for human voters could be used successfully by artificial agents that act as
proxies for voters. One example is iterative voting, in which repeated elections are
staged in search for a more consensual voting outcome (see, e.g., Meir, 2017, for a
survey). The use of voting avatars takes the burden of intensive communication away
from the voter, and reinforcement learning techniques could be tested in this setting to
obtain novel voting strategies and rules (Airiau et al., 2017).
Combinatorial voting and judgment aggregation. By making high-frequency col-
lective decisions possible, the development of voting avatars will be confronted with a
large and interconnected space of alternative choices. This would require compact rep-
resentations for voters’ views and preferences, such as those developed in the area of
combinatorial voting (Lang and Xia, 2016), as well as a detailed understanding of the
counterintuitive results and paradoxical situations that arise when aggregating them,
such as those settings analysed by the theory of judgment aggregation (Endriss, 2016).
Argumentation. Political views and voters’ behaviour are the result of discussions
and debates, both in the social neighbourhood of a voter and in society in general. The
field of (computational) argumentation is a vast enterprise ranging from the elicita-
tion of arguments from natural language, to the identification of winning arguments
in a debate between multiple agents. Theoretical research in this field (see, e.g.,
Rahwan and Simari, 2009) is recently being complemented by technologies that can
form the basis of personal assistants for the construction of political views.
Social influence. A voting avatar will be scouting for opinions presented in in-
fluential newspapers or expressed by a designated set of influential voting avatars.
Computational-friendlymodels of influence need to be developed, perhaps based on the
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extensive research on trust and reputation in multiagent systems (Sabater and Sierra,
2005). The relation between social choices and social networks have recently been
investigated by a number of papers (see, e.g., Grandi, 2017, for a survey)
4 Conclusions and Challenges
We may be quite far from a society in which collective choices of all sorts are taken
every day in large numbers by means of artificial agents that vote on our behalf. How-
ever, in this paper I argue that the implementation of similar “voting avatars” is a viable
solution to the lack of voter participation which affects e-democracy applications, and
would moreover constitute a prime application for many of the techniques developed
in computational social choice and multiagent systems in general. A first step in this
direction could be the development of decision-aid systems, which help voters con-
struct their political views and opinions on current issues, building on existing (simple)
technologies such as Vote Match7 in UK, or Stemwijzer8 in the Netherlands.
There are, however, a number of scientific challenges that need to be tackled. First,
representing a voter’s view may require combining techniques from computational
knowledge representation with complex models of voting behaviour coming from po-
litical science and sociology. Second, data protection and security will be a key aspect
of developing artificial agents acting on behalf of humans. However, this problem is
shared by virtually all electronic applications of voting. A related problem is vote buy-
ing and vote influence in general, given the availability of data about voters’ views
and votes that might be generated by moving to electronic platforms for collective
decision-making. Solutions may be sought in cryptography algorithms, which may be
easier to apply to societies of artificial agents rather than human ones (see, e.g., the
recent work of Parkes et al. (2017)). Third, a functional voting avatar needs to be able
to explain its behaviour to the voter in an understandable and convincing way. Expla-
nation and interpretation are among the most important challenges for the deployment
of artificial intelligence techniques in society, and a recent survey argues in favour of
importing sociological theories of explanation to create transparent and trustworthy al-
gorithms (Miller, 2017). Investigating how an artificial agent can explain simple voting
behaviours in terms of the input preferences received may constitute a first step in this
direction. Last, the design of voting avatars that can act as proxies for voters raises all
sorts of ethical questions – from the level of autonomy of such an artificial proxy to
the legal status of agent-mediated collective decisions – some of which are currently
debated as general ethical issues related to the employment of artificial intelligence
technologies in our societies. It turns out that voting itself might be a possible mean of
developing collective views on similar ethical problems (Noothigattu et al., 2018).
7www.votematch.org.uk
8www.stemwijzer.nl
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